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Brazil, Mexico and a few other Latin American republics enjoyed faster industrialization after 1870
than did the rest of Latin America and even faster than the rest of the poor periphery (except East Asia).
How much of this economic performance was due to more accommodating institutions and greater
political stability, changes that would have facilitated greater technology transfer and accumulation?
That is, how much to changing fundamentals?  How much instead to a cessation in the secular rise
in the net barter terms of trade which reversed de-industrialization forces, thus favoring manufacturing?
How much instead to cheaper foodstuffs coming from more open commercial policies ('grain invasions'),
and from railroad-induced integration of domestic grain markets, serving to keep urban grain prices
and thus nominal wages in industry low, helping to maintain competitiveness? How much instead
to more pro-industrial real exchange rate and tariff policy? Which of these forces contributed most
to industrialization among the Latin American leaders, long before their mid 20th century adoption
of ISI policies? Changing fundamentals, changing market conditions, or changing policies?
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1. On Being Misled: Prebisch, Singer and the Terms of Trade Debate 
Debate over trends in the terms of trade between primary products and manufactures, 
their causes and their impact has dominated the growth and development literature for almost two 
centuries. Classical economists claimed that the relative price of primary products should 
improve over time, since land and other natural resources were in inelastic supply while capital 
and labor were not. The experience over the half century or so before the 1870s proved them 
right: the relative price of manufactures underwent a spectacular decline, while that of primary 
products soared (Figure 5). In the early 1950s, however, Raúl Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer 
(1950) challenged the classical view, asserting that the terms of trade of the primary-product-
producing Third World had deteriorated since the late 19
th century. Indeed, Prebisch calculated 
that only 63 percent of the finished manufactures which could be bought with a given quantity of 
primary products in the 1860s could be purchased in the 1930s. Prebisch and Singer also 
predicted that it would continue to deteriorate across the late 20
th century as long as the Third 
World specialized in primary products. It turned out that their prediction was not confirmed,
1 but 
our interest lies instead with the years from about 1870 to World War I, an era in which W. 
Arthur Lewis’ (1978) new world economic order – the rich core specializing in manufactures and 
the poor periphery in primary products -- was being challenged in some parts of the periphery. 
This important part of the development literature has its shortcomings.
2 While the pre-
1870s secular upswing of the terms of trade in the periphery clearly caused de-industrialization 
there (Williamson 2006a, 2006b, 2008), Prebisch, Singer and their followers ignored a symmetric 
corollary: on the downside following the 1870s, the secular terms of trade deterioration implied a 
long run stimulus to import-competing industry in the periphery. Prebisch and Singer ignored this 
                                                 
1 The relative price of primary products did not deteriorate over the late 20
th century (Grilli and Yang 1988; 
Blattman, Hwang and Williamson 2006), and by the end of the century most of the Third World exported 
labor-intensive manufactures (Martin 2003; Williamson 2006b). 
2 Although now more than 15 years old, a paper by Roberto Cortés Conde (1992) is still one of the best 
surveys of export-led growth and dependency paradigms as applied to Latin America for this period.   4
possibility,
3 and stressed instead the short run economic damage to a periphery specializing in 
primary products. The literature generated by Prebisch and Singer has another weakness: 
typically, it deals with the relative price of primary products in world markets, not with the terms 
of trade facing any given primary-product exporting country. Prebisch, Singer and the literature 
that followed never assessed the economic impact on the poor periphery of the secular fall, or of a 
cessation of the rise, in its terms of trade. Rather, they assumed it. 
We try to do better when assessing Latin American industrialization experience after 
1870, those critical decades before the interwar economic disaster, and before the introduction of 
anti-global ISI policies between the 1930s and 1970s. Furthermore, our interest is in the relative 
industrial performance around Latin America. In addition, we try to assess the relative 
contribution of world prices on Latin American performance compared with other domestic 
forces. Section 2 establishes the timing and pace of Latin American industrialization, with 
primary focus on the leaders – especially Brazil and Mexico. Industrialization was fast in some of 
those places, especially when compared with the rest of Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. 
Section 3 lists the leading explanations, not necessarily competing, for this impressive 
industrialization performance – changing world prices, changing productivity, changing policy 
and changing wage competitiveness. Section 4 explores the first, a dramatic change in net barter 
terms of trade (PX/PM) trends in much of Latin America, especially compared with the rest of the 
periphery. We argue that if, as the conventional literature asserts, a rise in the net barter terms of 
trade caused de-industrialization in the periphery prior to 1870 (through Dutch disease effects), 
then its stability or fall thereafter must have helped cause what might be called re-
industrialization. Section 5 explores a part of the second explanation -- an acceleration in total 
factor productivity growth in the export sector, especially mining. The latter should have raised 
                                                 
3 Not entirely, since at one point in his famous 1950 paper Singer noted that if the post-1950 relative price 
of primary products ever did improve, it would reduce industrialization incentives in the periphery (Singer 
1950: 482, italics added). However, Singer never elaborated on this statement, either in the 1950 paper or 
elsewhere. Nor did Prebisch. Nor did their followers.   5
the income terms of trade (PXX/PM), and, as Edward Beatty (2000) has argued so persuasively for 
Mexico, it should have contributed to export-led industrialization. We ask whether Mexican 
experience was exceptional, or whether it was repeated in other Latin American industrial 
leaders. Section 6 searches for other sources of Latin America’s increasing industrial 
competitiveness in their own markets – like cheaper food keeping the nominal industrial wage 
low. Section 7 explores the impact of real exchange rate depreciation, a force that would have 
improved local manufacturing competitiveness against foreign imports. Section 8 concludes with 
an agenda and a tentative judgment about the relative importance of changes in prices, policies 
and fundamentals. 
 
2. Measuring the Industrial Liftoff Across Latin America 
We are not the first to argue that industrialization started long before the 1930s in Latin  
America, indeed, even before World War I. Ezequiel Gallo (1970) made the case for Argentina 
back when dependency theory and export-led growth were the dominant paradigms. Warren Dean 
(1969) did the same for Brazil about the same time. Two decades later, Steve Haber (1989, 1990) 
made the same case for Mexico. While impressive, what is missing from this pioneering literature 
is an explicit comparative assessment of the timing and the pace of industrialization in Latin 
America, and a comprehensive assessment of its causes. We begin to fill that gap here.  
Whether measured by employment, output or value added, textile production dominated 
manufacturing in the late 19
th century, so we start there. Imports satisfied a significant part of 
Latin American total textile demand in the 1870s. In a previous paper (Dobado, Gomez and 
Williamson 2006), we reported that Mexico imported 40 million square meters of cloth in 1879, 
compared with 60 million square meters produced domestically. Thus, foreigners supplied 40% 
of the domestic market. Yet, these same data imply that domestic producers were able to claim 
60% of the local market, a fairly big number for a country that had been flooded with cheap, 
factory-made European textiles for almost a century. Indeed, compare Mexican experience with   6
that of other parts of the periphery: The share of the domestic market supplied by India’s textiles 
fell from 95% in 1833 to 35-42% in 1887,
4 the latter much lower than Mexico’s 60% in 1879. 
The de-industrialization forces were even more powerful in the Ottoman Empire where local 
industry’s market share of domestic demand fell from 97% in the early 1820s to only 11-38% in 
the early 1870s.
5 Thus, despite the importance of foreign imports, the Mexican textile industry 
was doing fairly well by the 1870s,
6 at least compared with the rest of the periphery. While we do 
not have the data to prove it, we doubt that the rest of Latin America was doing as well as Mexico 
was by the 1870s, but it appears that some parts of Latin America may have started at a higher 
base in 1870s than was true of the rest of the poor periphery.  
Table 1 offers more evidence of the prior de-industrialization experience, where Paul 
Bairoch’s (1991) estimates of Brazilian and Mexican industrialization levels are compared with 
those of Europe and Asia. Between 1800 and 1880, de-industrialization took place throughout 
what we now call the Third World. While Bairoch’s estimates imply that de-industrialization 
continued up to 1913 in Asia, Brazil and Mexico showed strong signs of recovery, or what we are 
calling here re-industrialization. Table 2 offers 1910 industrial production per capita figures for 
cotton yarn, steel, pig iron and cement, again from Bairoch (1991). While these figures confirm 
that Latin America was well behind the industrial leaders in the European core and their 
offshoots, only Japan out-performed Mexico in the poor periphery. The number two contender, 
Brazil, exceeded Mexico in one category, cotton yarn production, but was behind in the other 
three. Still, Brazil exceeded China, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and India. There were also some 
modest signs of industrial success in Chile, at least in per capita cement production. According to 
Bairoch’s estimates, the rest of Latin America was far behind, still conforming to the new 
international economic order by specializing in primary products. Table 3 offers another index of 
                                                 
4 The 1833 estimate and the smaller of the two 1887 estimates are from Roy (2000: 126). The larger 1887 
estimate comes from Tomlinson (1993: Table 3.3, 107). 
5 Pamuk (1986: Table 1, 211). The wide range for 1870-1872 is due to assumptions about the treatment of 
yarn imports. Both are far lower than Mexico, however.   
6 For more confirmation, see Keremitsis (1987: 703).   7
industrial performance at the end of the period, net exports (+) or imports (-) of cotton textile 
manufactures per capita in 1910, an index that includes yarn, thread and cloth of all sorts. Mexico 
had a cotton textile net import balance of close to zero, US$0.24 per capita, compared with the 
net export position of the United Kingdom of US$11.25 per capita. No Latin American country 
did better than Mexico, the closest competitor being Brazil (net imports of US$1.04 per capita), 
and most did far worse. Indeed, Argentina (net imports of US$5.47) joined Australia (US$8.70) 
in recording the highest dependence on imported cotton textile manufactures in the periphery.  
As one additional piece of evidence to identify how the Latin American industrial leaders 
were doing early in the 20
th century, the first panel of Table 4 reports estimates of the share of the 
home textile goods market supplied by domestic industry. Two facts leap out of the table. First, 
by the early 20
th century, Brazil’s domestic textile industry had carved out an impressive share of 
its local market, 65.3 percent, but that share was considerably smaller than that of Mexico, 77.9 
percent. By this gauge alone, Mexico was more successful industrially than was Brazil. 
Argentina, on the other hand, could report very little industrial success by 1913, local industry 
claiming only 15.5 to 17.5 percent of the home textile market. So much for light industry. The 
second panel of Table 4 reports smaller market shares for heavy industrial product groups. 
Although they are harder to document, what data we do have reports significant domestic shares 
on the rise for Mexico: its domestic producers’ share of the local iron and steel market rose from 
6 to 28 percent between 1903 and 1911, while that for coke rose from 17 to 47 percent. The 1913 
figure for metals and machinery in Argentina was only 12 percent. Second, Mexico increased 
significantly its share of the home textile market between early Porfiriato and the Revolution, 
from 60 to 77.9 percent between 1879 and 1906-1908, an increase of almost 20 percentage points. 
Table 5 reports the share of the labor force employed in manufacturing between 1895 and 1910. 
The figures for Argentina and Chile are surprisingly high, 19-25 percent, given that the rapidly 
industrializing United States had ‘only’ reached 19-20 percent between 1870 and 1890. Great 
Britain, however, had reached 29 percent by 1801 and 33 percent in 1910. Oddly enough, the   8
figures for Mexico (11-12 percent) seem very low, perhaps because the source excluded or 
understated small scale manufacturing without mechanical power. 
These facts offer strong support for the view that the Latin American industrial leaders 
did indeed experience a lift off before 1913, and certainly long before the 1930s and its early ISI 
policies. There must have been rapid industrialization in Brazil and Mexico during the four 
decades after 1870. The question, however, is when the lift off happened.    
  Stephen Haber (2002) has argued that the true liftoff of Mexican industry came towards 
the last third of the 19th century. Haber dates the beginning of the liftoff in the late 1880s. Almost 
half a century after Mexico’s initial mechanization efforts, the 1888 industry was, according to 
Haber, still small and unproductive (although bigger and more productive than almost anywhere 
else in the poor periphery). But in the decade that followed, “the industry more than doubled in 
size. By 1911, the industry had grown an additional 50 percent. Estimates of total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth … indicate increases of between 1.5 percent (lower bound) and 3.3 
percent (upper bound) per year.  Labor productivity grew even faster … between 3.0 and 4.7 
percent per year” (Haber 2002: 7-8). Such growth rates meant that Mexican textile producers had 
displaced most imported cloth by 1914 (Haber 2002: 11). Tables 3 and 4 confirmed Haber’s 
inference: the first showed that Mexican net imports of cotton manufactures per capita were 
almost zero in 1910, and the second showed that local producers claimed more than three-
quarters of the domestic market for all textiles in 1906-08. The only foreign textiles still being 
imported were high quality, fine-weave cloth. Table 4 suggests a modification to Haber’s dating 
of the Mexican liftoff; the trade data suggest it got a somewhat earlier start than 1888. 
In an effort to better identify Latin American industrial leaders and the timing of their 
industrialization experience in the decades before World War I, Table 6, Table 7 and Figures 1-3 
report evidence based on exports to Latin America from the United States and the United 
Kingdom. These were the main suppliers of industrial intermediates, energy sources and capital 
goods used in Latin American industry, so we assume that manufacturing machinery, iron and   9
steel, and coal imports (in constant US dollars) are good proxies for relative industrial growth. 
Tables 6-7 and Figures 1-3 allow us to compare industrialization progress 1870-1914 between 
Latin American countries. Others have used similar data before (Suzigan 1986; Kuntz 2007), but 
not comparatively as we do here. Recently Xavier Tafunell, Albert Carreras and César Yañez 
have used data documenting capital goods exports to Latin America to assess gross capital 
formation levels in twenty Latin American countries between 1890 and 1930 (Yañez, Rubio and 
Carreras 2006; Tafunell 2007a; Tafunell 2007b; Tafunell and Carreras 2008). Their work has 
shown that these data are reliable, and that most machinery exports to Latin America came from 
just three nations: the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany (for eight Latin American 
countries in 1913, 86.5% of total machinery exports to the region).  
Here we consider only the machinery and iron and steel products that were used by 
manufacturing, that is, following Wilson Suzigan, we exclude all agricultural and railroad related 
machinery. We aggregate imports from the United States and United Kingdom only, which 
accounted for 63.3% of machinery imports by eight Latin American countries in 1913.
7 Since we 
wish to compare trends and not the levels of machinery imports across Latin America, we do not 
think our exclusion of German and other country machinery exports to Latin America is a 
problem. 
Figure 1 plots the import time series for the combination of manufacturing machinery 
(hereafter machinery), iron and steel (hereafter iron) and coal from 1870 to 1914 (1900=100). 
According to this proxy, all four of these Latin American countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico – exhibited impressive growth over the four decades. True, three of them underwent 
high volatility: Argentina, Brazil and Chile all recorded big booms in the late 1880s-early 1890s 
                                                 
7 Tafunell (2007). According to Carreras and Tafunell (2008), the UK+US machinery import shares in total 
Latin American machinery imports were the following: Argentina 60.6%, Brazil 56.6% Chile 56.3%, and 
Mexico 85.2%.  However, the comparison of our Brazilian data with Suzingan’s (which includes UK, US 
and Germany) indicates that 1913 was the year when our data (which includes UK and US) was the lowest 
relative to Suzigan’s (57.3%). As an average over 1870-1914, our series was 99.3% of Suzigan’s and both 
series have exactly the same trend.     10
and again in the run up to WWI, as well as a big bust in the 1890s. Mexico did not undergo this 
volatility before 1900, but, of course, it did undergo a secular slow down up to and during the 
Revolution. Figure 2 breaks out machinery imports separately, but the series shows pretty much 
the same trends. Figure 3 plots the combination of machinery, iron and coal as a share of Gross 
Domestic Product (in 1990 US dollars). The volatility is still there for Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile, but the growth seen in Figure 1 has disappeared from the three: between 1870-1874 and 
1900-1904, the share of those combined imports in GDP fell for both Argentina and Chile, and it 
rose hardly at all for Brazil. In contrast, before the run up to the Revolution, Mexico’s share 
increased seven times! 
  Now consider Tables 6 and 7, where we report the growth rates of both proxies (in US 
dollars). Table 6 documents growth rates of the combined import package: the volatility of 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile is revealed once more, and so is Mexico’s dominant industrialization 
(at least according to this proxy). Between 1871 and 1901, Mexico grew almost twice as fast as 
the average (10.89 versus 5.68 percent per annum), and it grew faster even when the run up to 
and including the Revolution is included (1871-1911, 7.44 versus 5.65 percent per annum). In 
addition, the table shows that the lift off was during the first two decades, not later as Haber 
suggested. That is, the average growth rate of the four was 6.97 percent per annum before 1891 
and 4.37 after. Some of this slow down can, of course, be attributed to Mexico’s special political 
problems, but the same slow down is apparent for Argentina and Brazil. The growth of 
manufacturing machinery itself reported in Table 7 repeats the findings of Table 6: prior to 1891, 
Mexican growth rates exceed the average, 10.95 versus 7.30 percent per annum, and the growth 
rates before 1891 (10.42 percent) exceed those afterwards (3.75 percent).   
To summarize, we have documented the following: industrialization of the economic 
leaders in Latin America was very impressive between 1870 and 1913, especially compared with 
the rest of the poor periphery; Mexico underwent the most impressive industrialization 
performance; and the lift off occurred well before 1890, not after.   11
3. Some Leading Non-Competing Explanations for the Latin American Industrial Liftoff 
What explains the timing and the pace of the Latin American industrial lift off? It seems 
to us that there are five likely candidates, candidates that we hope future research will be able to 
assess more precisely than we are able to do here.   
First, it has been shown that Latin America was far more protectionist than anywhere else 
in the late 19
th century (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004). Figure 4 shows that Latin America 
had the highest tariffs in the world from the late 1880s onwards (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Peru and Mexico among the most protectionist),
8 and that before the late 1880s only 
the United States had higher average tariff rates. Furthermore, these average tariff rates were on 
the rise between 1865 and 1890, and they were maintained at that high level until just prior to 
World War I. Perhaps more to the point, Mexico adopted far more coherent and consistent pro-
industrial tariff policies under the Porfiriato regime. Latin American policy-makers in the late 19
th 
century Latin America were certainly aware of infant industry arguments (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: 
p.140), but tariffs were not used specifically and consciously to foster industry in Mexico until 
the early 1890s. Edward Beatty (2001) and Graciela Márquez (2002) have argued persuasively 
that the 1880s and 1890s saw the introduction of a modern pro-industrial policy in Mexico, 
including a rational structure of protection. This policy was followed with a lag elsewhere in 
Latin America, Brazil and Chile a little later in the 1890s, and Colombia in the early 1900s 
(Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a; 2004b). Haber agrees with Márquez and Beatty: “In 1891 
Mexico was using tariffs to protect the cotton textile industry” which perhaps would have 
otherwise been uncompetitive. “This meant high tariffs on competing goods and low tariffs on 
inputs. The tariff on imported cloth tended to be twice that of the tariff on imported raw cotton. 
The result was an effective rate of protection that varied from 39 to 78 percent” (Haber 2002: 
                                                 
8 The tariff rates would, of course, be even higher if we looked only at manufacturers.   12
16).
9 This explanation is especially appealing since we want to account for the fast Mexican 
industrial liftoff compared with the rest of the periphery. Most of Asia and the Middle East did 
not have the autonomy to pursue pro-industrial policies, and we also know that pro-industrial 
Mexican policy led the rest of the autonomous Latin American republics by a decade or two. 
We do not deny that the more rational protectionist policy increased its support for local 
industry. However, this paper will explore the additional impact of four other influences. The first 
is world prices and the net barter terms of trade. We will show below that there was a big secular 
change in world relative prices facing the Mexican economy after the 1870s, a change that no 
longer penalized local manufacturing, and textiles in particular. Elsewhere, we have shown that a 
good part of the exceptionally modest Mexican de-industrialization experience in the century 
before 1870 was due to an exceptionally modest terms of trade shock compared to the rest of 
Latin America, Asia and the Middle East (Williamson 2006a, 2006b; Dobado, Gómez and 
Williamson 2006). We think the same was true of the half century after 1870, but in the opposite 
direction: as we show below, Latin America’s terms of trade fell earlier and faster than anywhere 
else in the periphery, especially for Mexico. Second, there was also an acceleration in total factor 
productivity growth in one key export activity in Latin America, mining. This served to 
contribute to the fall in the net barter terms of trade, but, given a price elastic demand facing 
silver, copper and other metals, it also served to raise the income terms of trade. It appears that 
these productivity events were unusual for the poor periphery at that time, including much of 
Latin America itself. Third, there is some evidence supporting the view that, compared with the 
rest of the periphery, Latin American industry may have been kept more competitive since it 
faced weaker upward pressure on the nominal wage, forces induced by weaker upward pressure 
on food prices. The latter can be explained by policy towards food imports and domestic market 
integration by the railroads. Finally, there is the impact of the depreciation of local currencies to 
                                                 
9 By 1960, Mexico had much lower tariffs on capital goods and industrial raw materials than did Argentina 
or Brazil (Taylor 1998; Haber 2006: Table 13.8, p. 574).   13
consider. As we shall see, the biggest real exchange rate depreciation between 1870 and 1913 
took place in Brazil and Mexico, especially the latter, forces which must have contributed to their 
impressive industrialization performance. 
 
4. No More Dutch Disease? 
The Big Change in Latin American Net Barter Terms of Trade Trends 
Did Latin America face a big secular change in world relative price trends, a change that 
no longer penalized local manufacturing, and textiles in particular? If so, was the secular change 
bigger than elsewhere in the poor periphery, especially among the Latin American industrial 
leaders? 
Figure 5 suggests the answer is most definitely yes. There we see that after the net barter 
terms of trade for Latin America reached a secular peak in the mid-late 1870s, it leveled off up to 
the early-mid 1890s, after which it also fell far more dramatically up to the early 1900s than 
elsewhere in the periphery. It never recovered even a third of the previous peaks by 1913. 
Between 1870-74 and 1909-13, the terms of trade in Latin America fell by 10% (Table 8), this 
after rising by 174% over the seven decades between 1800-04 and 1870-74 (Williamson 2008)! 
In contrast, the rest of the periphery underwent no net fall over the four decades: the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia underwent a continuous terms of trade improvement from the mid-1870s 
onwards, while South Asia and East Asia underwent no change either way. Figure 6 shows which 
parts of Latin America underwent the biggest changes in terms of trade trend. In contrast with 
Argentina and Chile, Mexico underwent a big fall in its terms of trade after the early-mid 1890s: 
the Mexican terms of trade was cut in half between 1890 and 1902,
10  twice as big as the rest of 
Latin America (see also Salvucci 2006: Table 7.6, p. 283). Furthermore, while the primary 
product boom in the decade or so before 1913 is reflected in a rise in terms of trade everywhere in 
the poor periphery, the rise was very modest in Mexico, and that rise did not come close to 
                                                 
10 The real exchange rate also depreciated by about 50% just between 1885 and 1892 (Catão 1998: 74), and 
it never recovered. We return to this in Section 7 below.   14
recovering the secular peak in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Indeed, the Mexican terms of trade 
fell by 37.2% between 1870-74 and 1910-13 (Table 8), while it rose by 11% in the rest of Latin 
America.
11 While Mexico was exceptional compared with the Latin American average, there are 
other deviants also plotted with thick solid lines in Figure 6 and reported in Table 8, namely, 
Cuba (-21.7%) and Peru (-27.5%). Brazil and Venezuela underwent hardly any change at all in 
their terms of trade over the four decades, but even this stability represented a marked change in 
world economic conditions after 70 years of rising terms of trade and thus falling relative prices 
of manufactures. Brazil and Venezuela also underwent a huge fall in their terms of trade between 
the early 1890s and World War I. So did Columbia, but in that case the run up to the 1890s offset 
the post-1890s collapse. 
In summary, a fall (or no rise) in the net barter terms of trade implied a rise (or no fall) in 
the relative price of imported manufactures, an event which favored (or no longer penalized) 
domestic industry. If a rising terms of trade caused de-industrialization in the six or seven decades 
before the 1870s (Dobado, Gómez and Williamson 2006; Williamson 2008), it follows that a 
falling or stable terms of trade after 1870 should have helped cause a good share of Mexican, 
Brazilian and even Venezuelan industrialization experience up to 1913. 
   
5. Productivity Growth, the Income Terms of Trade, and Export-Led Growth 
in Latin America 
  So far, we have assumed that the Latin American republics had no influence over their 
export or import prices, and thus that their terms of trade was determined exogenously in world 
markets. While this was certainly true of those countries in Table 8 whose commodity exports 
were only a small share of world exports of that commodity – like Argentina (maize, wheat), 
Columbia (coffee, gold), Cuba (sugar, tobacco), Peru (copper), Uruguay (wool, meat), and 
Venezuela (coffee, cacao), it certainly was not true of the others in Table 8 – Chile (nitrates, 
                                                 
11 This is based on a 1870 population weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru 
and Uruguay, all reported in Table 5.   15
copper), Mexico (silver), and Brazil (coffee, rubber). Indeed, Edward Beatty (2000) has argued 
persuasively that Mexican mineral supplies to the world market, especially silver, did indeed help 
precipitate the big decline in its net barter terms of trade: by flooding the market with silver, 
Mexico lowered the world price of silver and worsened its terms of trade. Beatty also argues that 
it was rapid productivity advance in Mexican mining that produced that result, but since the 
demand for minerals was price elastic, total export values and foreign exchange earnings boomed, 
creating export-led growth.  
Figure 7 describes the two hypotheses. In case 7B, the country takes its export prices as 
exogenous: export prices fall in world markets (from P to P’), but domestic supply expands 
sufficiently fast (S to S’) to offset the price decline, augmenting total export revenue. One can 
imagine an even greater domestic supply shift (to S”) which would have produced more exports 
and more foreign exchange earnings. Clearly, whatever economic success one observed in this 
case would be attributed unambiguously to the domestic export supply growth, rather than to 
changing conditions in world markets. In any case, the fall in its net barter terms of trade (PX/PM) 
could not have been a powerful industrialization stimulus in this case since the improved relative 
price of industrial output must have been at least partially offset by the improved productivity in 
the commodity export sector that pushed S to S’ or S’’.
12 This case seems to apply to Cuba, Peru 
and Venezuela, countries in Table 8 which experienced a decline in their net barter terms of trade 
and only a very modest improvement in their income terms of trade. Now consider the case in 7B 
where export prices rise (from P to P”), a case which appears to apply to Argentina and 
Colombia, both of which underwent a big increase in their net barter and their income terms of 
trade. No stimulus to industrialization in this case either, but rather de-industrial penalties. 
Although we do not have income terms of trade estimates for Uruguay, we suspect the same 
would apply to it as well.   
                                                 
12 Unless, of course, productivity growth was faster in manufacturing where prices were fixed by world 
market conditions.   16
Now consider Beatty’s hypothesis in Case 7A. Here, the same export supply expansion 
(S to S’) lowers the country’s export price since it’s a big player in world markets. But given a 
price elastic demand, and given an additional outward shift in demand (D to D’), export revenues 
and foreign exchange earnings expand: the bigger the outward supply shift (and productivity 
advance in the export sector), the bigger the fall in the net barter terms of trade and the rise in the 
income terms of trade. Mexico appears to be the exception which proves Beatty’s rule: a very big 
decline in the net barter terms of trade (after a long secular boom) was consistent with a very big 
increase in the income terms of trade. If Beatty’s evidence of rapid productivity growth in 
Mexican mining holds up, we have an explanation for Mexico’s income terms of trade rising and 
its net barter terms of trade falling. While Table 9 confirms this prediction (a result Beatty found 
with other data), Beatty’s supply side argument cannot apply to mineral-producing Chile, since its 
net barter terms of trade did not fall, but rather rose. Table 9 also suggests that the hypothesis gets 
ambiguous support at best for Brazil: in this case, the net barter terms of trade was stable after the 
long and spectacular pre-1870 boom while the income terms of trade underwent only a modest 
increase. 
 
6. Keeping the Lid on Wages?  
The Own Wage and Industrial Competitiveness in the Latin American 
  Table 5 documents that the share of the 1895 labor force in manufacturing ranged from a 
quarter in Argentina and Chile to an eighth in Mexico. These employment shares imply that real 
wages – nominal wages divided by the cost of living (w/Pc) -- were determined by labor 
productivity elsewhere in the economy – mining, construction, agriculture and services – not in 
manufacturing itself. Slow-growing labor productivity in the rest of the economy would have 
given Latin American manufacturing the advantage of modest upward pressure on per unit wage 
costs, making it more competitive with North America and western Europe, where the upwards 
pressures were much stronger. It was, of course, the own-wage that mattered to employers in 
manufacturing, the nominal wage divided by the price of manufactures (w/Pm). If the price of   17
foodstuffs (Pa) was the central determinant of the cost of living in Latin America, and if Pa/Pm 
was falling, we would have another reason to expect local manufactures in Latin America to have 
undergone increasing wage competitiveness compared with foreign firms. Is there any reason to 
think that Pa/Pm should have fallen? Yes, and for two reasons: first, to the extent that the post-
1870s grain invasion flooded Latin American markets in grain importing regions; and second, to 
the extent that railroads brought cheaper grain in to urban interior markets where manufacturing 
was located (Dobado and Marrero 2005). The issue is how much? 
  Table 10 reports Pa/Pm for three countries which offer the necessary times series data -- 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Mexico recorded the biggest Pa/Pm decline from 1874-1878 to 
1913, 34 percent; Brazil the second, 21 percent; and Uruguay the third, 11 percent. Thus, the 
grain-invasion-cum-railroads prediction is confirmed, and, furthermore, the two fastest 
industrializing countries recorded the biggest fall in Pa/Pm.  
But did cheaper grains necessarily mean lower nominal wages and thus greater wage 
competitiveness of local manufacturing? Table 11 reports the own-wage facing manufacturing 
firms (w/Pm) for four countries which offer the necessary time series data -- Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Uruguay. Based on this evidence, it appears that Brazil and Uruguay had the 
industrial advantage on this score since the upward pressure on the own-wage in manufacturing 
was much greater in Chile and Mexico. Indeed, over the period 1870-1913 as a whole, the own-
wage in Brazil grew no faster than it did in the United States, the former remaining competitive 
with the latter on that score at least. By the same criteria, wage competitiveness in Chile 
deteriorated relative to the United States, as did that of Mexico (but not as much as Chile). Of 
course, there were other forces determining competitiveness, but if we are looking for 
explanations for precocious industrialization in Brazil and Mexico, better wage competitiveness 
was not one of them, although the former did better on this score than did the latter. 
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7. Did Real Currency Depreciation Increase Manufacturing Profitability? 
  Depreciation of the domestic currency favors local manufacturing since it makes 
imported manufactures more expensive in the local market. Currency appreciation does the 
opposite. When trading partners have different rates of inflation, the nominal exchange rate must 
be adjusted to take account of the differential inflation rates, yielding a real exchange rate. The 
real exchange rate (RER) is yet another force which could have helped account for the timing and 
pace of industrialization in Latin America before 1913. 
  Figure 8 plots the RER for four Latin American republics – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. The figure makes it quite clear that manufacturing in Chile must have been greatly 
disadvantaged by real exchange rate trends, since it underwent significant real currency 
appreciation. Although its RER trends are not plotted in Figure 8, this was even truer of Colombia 
which underwent a 20 percent real currency appreciation 1881-1899 (Meisel and López 1990), an 
even more spectacular appreciation during the inflation 1899-1905, and then stability 1905-1913 
(GRECO 2002).  The appreciation of the RER must have slowed down the first symptoms of 
modern industrial development in Colombia during the late 19
th century, delaying that process 
until the beginning of the 20
th century (Ocampo 1984, 192).  Argentina underwent no secular 
change in its real exchange rate between 1884 and 1913, so it could not have offered any stimulus 
to import-competing manufacturing there. However, the real exchange rate did undergo secular 
depreciation in Brazil and Mexico, and the magnitudes appear to have been big: Mexico 
underwent a real currency depreciation of 82 percent between the mid 1870s and 1913 and Brazil 
underwent a real currency depreciation of 36 percent between the early 1870s and 1913.  
In short, some part of the industrial lift off in Brazil and Mexico can indeed be explained 
by a real exchange rate depreciation up to 1913. This was not true of Argentina, Chile or 
Colombia. 
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8. A Future Research Agenda: Decomposing the Sources of the Industrial Lift Off 
This paper does not offer any explicit empirical decomposition of the sources of the 
industrial liftoff in Latin America between 1870 and World War I, although we certainly hope 
that future research will do so. At this point, we do not believe that the evidence is sufficient for 
that demanding task. Thus, we have been content to lay out the contending explanations, to offer 
what we hope is some plausible support for them, and to set out an agenda. Still, when future 
research offers an explicit empirical decomposition of the industrial lift off, this paper will have 
shown how those decompositions are likely to have differed across countries, and which are 
likely to have been the major actors.  
Our prior is that changing fundamentals will end up playing a much more modest role in 
contributing to the industrial lift off than the current neo-institutional literature supposes. We 
stress the word changing, since it had to have been changing fundamentals raising productivity in 
manufacturing, or changing external terms of trade or domestic wage competitiveness improving 
profitability in manufacturing, or changing tariff and real exchange rates improving profitability 
in manufacturing that accounted for the lift off, not levels of any of the three. 
Changing external terms of trade must have played a big role, as the immense pre-1870 
boom in the external terms of trade – a pre-1870 fall in the relative price of imported 
manufactures, switched to a post-1870 bust in the external terms of trade – a post-1870 rise in the 
relative price of imported manufactures. What had been a sickly Dutch disease before 1870 
became a healthy Dutch revival after 1870. Furthermore, Mexico underwent the biggest reversal 
in its secular terms of trade trends, followed by Brazil and Venezuela. Thus, industrialization was 
favored in these three republics compared to the rest of Latin America. These forces were strong 
and it is time for the literature to pay more attention to them. 
Changing tariff and real exchange rate policy also must have played a big role. Tariff 
rates on manufactures rose in Latin America over these four decades, and the effective rate of 
protection rose even more as the tariff structure was rationalized. Since Mexico led the way, it   20
had the first strike advantage of effective pro-industrial policy, and this long before the early-ISI 
protectionist policies of the 1930s. In addition, the real exchange rate depreciated for both Brazil 
and Mexico, offering more benefits to import-competing industry. Since the other major Latin 
American republics did not undergo the same real currency depreciation, the two leaders enjoyed 
a first strike pro-industrial advantage – this long before the well-known real currency 
depreciations of the 1930s. 
We doubt that improved wage competitiveness played a role, since the effects, though 
positive, were too small to matter much. 
It is important to get more precise answers to the sources-of-the–lift-off question. We 
have been able to document impressive industrialization rates among the Latin America leaders – 
Brazil and Mexico – between 1870 and 1913. We will understand much better the impact of Latin 
American ISI policies between the 1930s and 1970s, let alone the free trade policies that followed 
in the late 20
th century, when they are linked more closely to the industrialization lift off before 
1913, and the policies and prices that produced it. 
 
   21
References 
P. Bairoch (1991), “How and Not Why; Economic Inequalities Between 1800 and 1913: Some  
Background Figures,” in J. Batou (ed.), Between Development and Underdevelopment 
(Geneva: Librairie). 
E. Beatty (2000), “The Impact of Foreign Trade on the Mexican Economy: Terms of Trade and  
the Rise of Industry 1880-1923,” Journal of Latin American Studies 32: 399-433. 
E. Beatty (2001), Institutions and Investment. The Political Basis of Industrialization in Mexico 
Before 1911 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press). 
C. Blattman, J. Hwang and J. G. Williamson (2006), ”The Impact of the Terms of Trade on  
Economic Development in the Periphery, 1870-1939: Volatility and Secular Change,” 
Journal of Development Economics (forthcoming).  
J. Braun, M. Braun, I. Briones and J. Díaz, Economía Chilena 1810-1995. Estadísticas Históricas  
Working Paper No. 187. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, January 2000. 
V. Bulmer-Thomas (1994), The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
L. Catão (1998), “Mexico and export-led growth: the Porfirian period revisited,” Cambridge  
Journal of Economics 22, 1(January): 59-78. 
W. A. G. Clark (1909), Cotton Goods in Latin America, Part I: Cuba, Mexico, and Central  
America. Special Agent Series No. 31 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce and 
Labor, Bureau of Manufactures, U.S. Government Printing Office). 
W. A. G. Clark (1910), Cotton Goods in Latin America, Part II: Brazil, Colombia,  and  
Venezuela. Special Agent Series No. 36 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce 
and Labor, Bureau of Manufactures, U.S. Government Printing Office). 
J. H. Coatsworth and J. G. Williamson (2004a), “Always Protectionist? Latin American  
Tariffs from Independence to Great Depression,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, 
part 2 (May): 205-32. 
J. H. Coatsworth and J. G. Williamson (2004b), AThe Roots of Latin American Protectionism: 
Looking Before the Great Depression.@ In A. Estevadeordal, D. Rodrik, A. Taylor and A. 
Velasco (eds.), FTAA and Beyond: Prospects for Integration in the Americas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
Compañía Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey (1923), Annual Report to the General  
Assembly (Mexico City). 
R. Cortés Conde (1992), “Export-Led Growth in Latin America: 1870-1930,” Journal of Latin  
American Studies, Supplement, 24: 165-79. 
W. Dean (1969), The Industrialization of São Paulo 1880-1945 (Austin: University of Texas  
Press). 
P. Deane and W. A. Cole (1962), British Economic Growth 1688-1959 (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press). 
R. Dobado and G. A. Marrero (2005), “Corn Market Integration in Porfirian Mexico,” Journal of  
Economic History 65, 1 (March): 103-28. 
R. Dobado, A. Gómez Galvarriato and J. G. Williamson (2006), “Globalization, De- 
Industrialization and Mexican Exceptionalism 1750-1879,” NBER Working Paper  
12316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. (June). 
A. Dorfman (1970, Historia de la Industria Argentina (Buenos Aires: Solar).  
E. Gallo (1970), “Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina, 1880-1930,” in  
R. Carr (ed.), Latin American Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press).   22
L. S. Garry (1920), Textile Markets of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Special Agent Series  
No. 194 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of 
Manufactures, U.S. Government Printing Office). 
GRECO (2002) Grupo de Estudios de Crecimiento, El Crecimiento económica colombiano en el  
siglo XX (Bogotá: Banco de la República y Fondo de Cultura Económica). 
E. R. Grilli and M. C. Yang (1988), “Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices,  
and the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: What the Long Run Shows,” World 
Bank Economic Review 2: 1-48. 
S. Haber (1989), Industry and Underdevelopment: The Industrialization of Mexico (Stanford:  
Stanford University Press). 
S. Haber (1990), “La economía mexicana, 1830-1940: obstáculos a la industrialización (II),”  
Revista de Historia Económica 8, 2: 335-62. 
S. Haber (2002), “It Wasn’t All Prebisch’s Fault: The Political Economy of Twentieth Century  
Industrialization in Latin America.” Unpublished, Stanford University. 
S. Haber (2006), “The Political Economy of Industrialization,” in V. Bulmer-Thomas, J.  
Coatsworth and R Cortés-Conde (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Latin 
America: Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 537-84. 
D. Keremitsis (1987), The Cotton Textile Industry in Porfiriato, Mexico 1870-1910 (New  
York: Garland Publishing). 
S. Kuntz (2007), El comercio exterior en México en la era del capitalismo liberal, 1870-1929 
(Mexico: El Colegio de México). 
W. A. Lewis (1978a), The Evolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press). 
A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 (OECD: Paris, 1995).  
G. Márquez (2002), “The Political Economy of Mexican Protectionism, 1868-1911," PhD  
thesis, Harvard University (March). 
W. Martin (2003), “Developing Countries’ Changing Participation in World Trade,” World Bank 
Research Observer 18(20): 187-203. 
A. Meisel Roca and A. López Mejia (1990), Papel moneda, tasas de interés y revaluación  
durante la Regeneración (Bogotá: Banco de la República). 
J. A. Ocampo (1984), Colombia y la Economía Mundial 1830-1910  (Bogotá: Siglo XXI  
editores de Colombia). 
Ş. Pamuk (1986), “The Decline and Resistance of Ottoman Cotton Textiles 1820-1913,”  
Explorations in Economic History 23 (April): 205-25. 
R. Prebisch (1950), The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems 
(New York: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America).  
T. Roy (2000), The Economic History of India, 1857-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
R. Salvucci (2006), “Export-Led Industrialization,” in V. Bulmer-Thomas, J. Coatsworth and R  
Cortés-Conde (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America: Volume II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
W. Suzigan (2000), Industria brasileira: origem e desenvolvimento (Sao Paulo: Hucitec and 
Unicamp). 
Seminario de Historia Moderna de México (1965), Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato,  
Fuerza de Trabajo y Actividad Económica por Sectores (México: El Colegio de México, 
1965). 
H. W. Singer (1950), "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries,"  
American Economic Review 40: 473-85. 
X. Tafunell (2007), “On the origins of ISI: The Latin American Cement Industry 1900-1930”, 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 39, 2: 299-328.   23
X. Tafunell and A. Carreras (2008), “América Latina y el Caribe en 1913 y 1925: un enfoque 
desde las importaciones de bienes de capital” El Trimestre Económico (forthcoming). 
X. Tafunell (2007), “Un factor clave del nexo entre energía y desarrollo durante la primera 
globalización: la dotación de maquinaria en América Latina, 1890-1930.” Paper 
presented at the First Congress of Latin American Economic History, Montevideo, 
December 5-7, 2007. 
A. M. Taylor (1998), “On the Costs of Inward-Looking Development: Price Distortions, Growth,  
and Divergence in Latin America,” Journal of Economic History 58 (March): 1-28. 
B. R. Tomlinson (1993), The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press). 
U. S. Department of Commerce (1870-1914), Bureau of Foreign and Domestic  
Commerce, The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (Washington, 
D.C.: USGPO, annual issues). 
U. S. Department of Commerce (1975), Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times  
to 1970: Part I (Washington, D.C.: USGPO). 
U. S. Congressional Papers (1912), 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 643, pt. 1  
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO). 
U. K. Parliamentary Papers (1870-1914), Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom  
with Foreign Countries and British Possessions (London: HMSO, annual issues). 
J. G. Williamson (2006a), ”Globalization, De-Industrialization and Underdevelopment in the  
Third World Before the Modern Era,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American History 
(Revista de Historia Económica) 24 1 (Primavera): 9-36.  
J. G. Williamson (2006b), Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950 (Cambridge, Mass.:  
MIT Press). 
J. G. Williamson (2008), “Globalization and the Great Divergence: Terms of Trade Booms and  
Volatility in the Poor Periphery 1782-1913,” the Hicks Lecture, Oxford University (May 
27). 
C. Yáñez, M. Rubio and A. Carreras (2006), “Economic modernisation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean between 1890 and 1925: A view from the energy consumption.” Paper 
presented at the 44
th Cliometrics Conference June 2-4 2006, Binghampton (NY).   24
 
          
Table 1 
Per Capita Industrialization Index Relative to 1900 UK and to Europe 
1800-1913 
          
   1800 1830 1860 1880 1900 1913 
         
Industrializing Leaders       
Europe  8  11 17 23 33  45 
United 
Kingdom  16 25 64 87 100  115 
          
Future Third World Followers Relative to 1900 United Kingdom   
B r a z i l    5   4445   7  
M e x i c o   6  4545  7  
C h i n a    6   6443   3  
I n d i a    6   6321   2  
          
Future Third World Followers Relative to 1900 Europe    
Brazil   15  12 12 12 15  21 
Mexico   18  12 15 12 15  21 
China   18  18 12 12 9  9 
India   18  18 9 6 3  6 
          
Source: Bairoch (1991): Table 1, p. 3.      
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                                                           Table 2 
                   Industrial Production Per Capita for Four Sectors in 1910 
          
   Cotton Yarn           Steel      Pig Iron        Cement
          
Industrializing Leaders       
          
Europe   4.8 73 74  45.6
United Kingdom    17.6 139.4 212.1  63.3
United States    10.8 255.1 269.2  129.9
Germany   6.5 204.4 198.7  176.1
Japan   3.8 4.4 3.8  10.5
          
Future Third World Followers 
          
China   0.2 0.1 0.5  0.4
Egypt   0.1 0 0  3
Ottoman Empire    0.2 0 0  1.2
India    0.9              na  0.2                Na 
          
Argentina   0.1 0 0  0.4
Brazil   3.4 0 0.2  0.1
Chile   0 0.3 0.3  7.5
Columbia   0.2 0 0  0.5
Mexico     2.1 4.1 3  3.2
Peru   0.6 0 0  0
Uruguay  0 0 0  1.8
Venezuela  0.2 0 0  0.8
          
Source: Bairoch (1991): Table 4, p. 10.    
Notes: na = not available.      
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    Table 3. An Index of Industrialization in Latin America around 1910:    
   Net Exports (+) and Net Imports (-) per capita of Cotton Manufactures   
        
  Country/Region 
                 
Index               Relative   
                   (UK=100)   
        
  United Kingdom  11.25 100  
        
  English-Speaking Periphery  -3.99 -35  
 United  States  -0.36 -3   
 Canada  -2.94 -26   
 Australia  -8.7 -77   
        
  Latin America Periphery        -2.43 -22  
 Mexico  -0.24 -2   
 Brazil  -1.04 -9   
 Venezuela  -1.78 -16   
 Chile  -3.62 -32   
 Argentina  -5.47 -49   
        
  Asia and Middle East Periphery  -0.72 -6  
  European Periphery  -0.65 -6  
        
 
Source: Trade data are from US Department of Commerce (1912), Tables  
106 and 107, pp. 214-19. Population data from Maddison (1995). 
    
  Note: Regional averages are unweighted.   
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Table 4.  Comparative Industrialization in Latin America 1879-1913: 
Manufacturers Import Penetration 
 
Percent of Home Textile Market Supplied by 
Foreign Imports        Domestic Industry 
 
Mexico 1879      40            60 
Colombia 1870s                        90                                         10 
 
Mexico 1906-1908    22.1            77.9 
Brazil 1907      34.7            65.3 
Argentina 1913           82.5-84.5        15.5-17.5 
 
Textile Sources: Mexico 1879 from Dobado, Gómez and Williamson (2006,  
Table 4). Mexico 1906-1908 from Clark (1909: 20 and 39). Colombia 1870s from 
Ocampo (2007: 35). Brazil 1907 from Clark (1910: 6). Argentina 1913 reports two 
estimates, the lower from Garry (1920: 22 and 31) and the upper from Dorfman  
(1970: 310). 
 
     Percent of Home Manufacturers Market Supplied by 
Foreign Imports        Domestic Industry 
 
Mexico, iron and steel 
1903    9 4      6  
1911      72                28 
Mexico, coke 
  1904      83                17 
  1911      53                47 
Argentina, metals 
and machinery 1913    88                12 
 
Other Sources: Mexico 1903-1911 from Compañia (1923). Argentina  
from Dorfman (1970: 310).     28
 
 
Table 5.  Share of the Labor Force in Manufacturing:  
Argentina, Chile, Mexico vs US and GB 1870-1910 (%) 
 
Year  Argentina  Chile  Mexico   US      GB 
 
1870        24.0    19.9        32.5 
1890       18.8        32.7 
1895       24  24.6         11.7     
1900                             22.8         12.2    20.3     32.9 
1910                              19.0         11.5    22.2     33.3 
 
Sources: Chile from Braun et al. (2000: 218-23); Mexico from  
Seminario (1965: 48); Argentina from Dorfman (1970: 310); US 
from Historical Statistics (1972), E167 and E174; and GB from  






       Table 6 Growth Rates per annum in Intermediates and Capital Goods Imports  
                                  From the US and UK ($) 1871-1911
             
Period    Argentina       Brazil        Chile     Mexico    Unweighted 
                 Average 
             
1871-1881    3.34%  4.27%    -0.55%  15.11%          5.54% 
1881-1891    7.51  7.02    8.27  6.89            8.51 
1891-1901    5.85  3.03    2.94  10.89            3.16 
1901-1911    9.98  8.07    7.43  -2.29            5.80 
             
1871-1891    7.51  5.64    3.82  10.92            6.97 
1871-1901    5.85  3.03    2.94  10.89            5.68 
1871-1911    6.86  4.26    4.05  7.44            5.65 
             
1871-1891    7.51  5.64    3.82  10.92            6.97 
1891-1911    6.22  2.91    4.28  4.06            4.37 
             
Source: The import data are reported exports in 1913 US dollars from the US and the UK in  
iron and steel, coal and manufacturing machinery. The US data are taken from US Department 
of Commerce (1870-1913). The UK data are taken from Parliamentary Papers (1870-1914).   




     Table 7 Growth Rates per annum in Manufacturing Capital Goods Imports  
                                  From the US and UK ($) 1871-1911 
            
  Period   Argentina        Brazil         Chile      Mexico    Unweighted 
               Average 
            
1871-1881 5.82%  8.92% -0.04% 12.81%   6.88% 
1881-1891 20.62  10.94 13.87 11.33   14.19 
1891-1901 0.56  -4.48 3.45 8.75   2.07 
1901-1911 6.88  10.23 11.32 -2.82   6.40 
            
1871-1891 12.98  9.93 6.69 12.07   10.42 
1871-1901 8.68  4.90 4.67 10.95   7.30 
1871-1911 8.23  6.21 6.29 7.33   7.02 
            
1871-1891 12.98  9.93 6.69 12.07   10.42 
1891-1911 3.68  2.61 5.90 2.80   3.75 
            
Source: The import data are reported exports of manufacturing machinery in 1913 
US dollars from the US and the UK. See Table 6. 





    Table 8. Net Barter Terms of Trade Change     
  in Latin America 1870-74 to 1909-13 (1900=100)    
            
  Country    1870-74     1909-13   
    %   
change    
            
  Increase          
   Argentina  103.3 138.8   34.4     
 Chile  83.1 148.4   78.5     
 Columbia  103.1 118.3   14.8     
 Uruguay  85.3 106.2   24.6     
            
  Decrease          
 Mexico  142.5 89.4   -37.2     
 Cuba  135.3 105.9   -21.7     
 Peru  134.9 97.8   -27.5     
            
  No Change          
 Brazil  115.1 115.9   0.7     
 Venezuela  107.9 105.9   -1.8     
            
  Latin America  118.1 106.9  -9.5    
            
  Note: Latin America is a 1870 population weighted average.   
            





             Table 9. Income Terms of Trade (INCTT) Growth 1870-1913 (1900=100)   
               
 
   
NBTT   1870X 
 
(1)(2)/100=  NBTT   1913X  
 




















increase               
Argentina 103.3  19.2 19.8 138.8 170.1 236.1    5.9 
Chile 83.1  38.6 32.1 148.4 163.3 242.3    4.8 
Colombia 103.1  114.0 117.5 118.3 267.0 315.9    2.3 
Uruguay  85.3                     106.2                                           
               
NBTT 
decrease               
Mexico 142.5  18.3 26.1 89.4 178.9 159.9    4.3 
Cuba  135.3                             105.9                                          
Peru 134.9  114.8 154.9 97.8 232.4 227.3    0.9 
               
NBTT no 
change               
Brazil 115.1  47.2 54.3 115.9 104.4 121.0    1.9 
Venezuela  107.9                             105.9                                          
               
Latin  America  118.1     106.9       
               
Sources: The NBTT data is taken from the sources underlying Figure 3, and Latin America is a 
1870 population weighted average. The export (X) volume data are taken from Maddison 
(1989: p. 140) and (1995: p. 236). The INCTT = (NBTT)(X) or XPx/Pm, where Px is the export 













Table 10.  Prices of Food Relative to Manufactures 
  (Pa/Pm) in Latin America 1870-1913 (1913=100)





1874 118.3 133.7 133.0
1875 114.2 135.2 116.9
1876 123.0 136.3 93.8
1877 124.9 129.9 119.8
1878 123.7 135.5 92.3
1879 120.0 132.7 82.2
1880 111.0 129.9 95.3
1881 112.8 125.5 89.5
1882 116.1 121.2 107.8
1883 109.4 117.0 94.2
1884 111.3 112.9 96.0
1885 111.2 122.5 101.7
1886 106.3 136.0 105.9
1887 116.9 142.7 104.9
1888 110.3 127.2 100.2
1889 125.5 118.4 76.3
1890 114.6 117.0 86.7
1891 113.4 114.4 88.4
1892 112.0 84.2 98.6
1893 131.2 86.8 103.9
1894 123.0 101.4 102.8
1895 106.1 116.9 51.1
1896 105.1 107.1 98.9
1897 122.1 78.4 92.9
1898 111.0 102.8 83.8
1899 90.2 126.9 87.1
1900 92.4 122.7 73.9
1901 100.7 106.3 82.5
1902 94.9 96.3 83.9
1903 90.4 112.8 79.7
1904 91.1 129.2 84.1
1905 94.5 97.5 77.7
1906 111.8 107.2 92.7
1907 102.1 110.8 84.7
1908 104.9 100.8 87.6
1909 95.4 84.3 91.8
1910 93.2 91.2 99.4
1911 103.5 89.7 107.3
1912 104.4 88.5 90.4
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0
% decline
1874-8 to 1913 -21% -34% -11%  33
                                1870-1913 (1913=100)
Year     Brazil     Chile   Mexico     Uruguay US
1870 47.3 26.9 94.7 48.8
1871 57.7 27.8 112.4 50.7
1872 59.9 29.1 112.4 49.1
1873 65.5 28.3 103.4 47.6
1874 64.7 27.5 93.4 52.0
1875 76.4 28.7 91.2 53.6
1876 79.4 29.1 87.8 52.2
1877 77.5 30.7 39.1 84.1 55.6
1878 72.7 31.2 40.0 81.0 58.9
1879 79.6 28.0 41.0 76.9 58.5
1880 78.6 25.3 42.2 74.4 53.9
1881 76.1 26.9 43.4 78.5 61.4
1882 88.4 33.5 44.5 81.1 64.3
1883 79.7 39.0 45.7 79.4 67.5
1884 90.0 41.6 46.9 83.1 72.3
1885 91.5 32.8 48.1 92.1 75.9
1886 91.2 36.5 48.8 98.3 81.0
1887 102.3 34.4 47.8 100.0 84.3
1888 99.4 39.3 50.5 97.9 85.0
1889 96.5 46.8 57.2 62.6 85.0
1890 90.5 46.9 56.6 89.0 82.4
1891 86.6 35.1 62.7 93.1 84.3
1892 80.6 39.4 71.4 105.5 88.9
1893 82.5 32.5 76.0 115.6 82.7
1894 80.2 29.0 74.6 117.5 87.2
1895 93.3 43.5 69.7 99.0 90.8
1896 78.0 46.2 69.7 94.0 94.1
1897 87.4 48.0 70.4 100.6 93.3
1898 71.2 51.8 71.7 77.1 89.8
1899 73.0 48.4 72.2 78.9 90.0
1900 78.9 60.3 70.9 78.3 87.4
1901 96.9 56.5 80.0 73.0 92.3
1902 102.5 60.2 84.6 94.9 88.5
1903 102.4 68.6 67.5 87.7 93.6
1904 101.8 70.1 71.5 95.9 92.8
1905 125.7 75.2 81.6 93.5 92.7
1906 124.1 73.3 72.6 84.3 96.3
1907 105.4 77.7 78.3 88.4 93.6
1908 110.6 82.5 74.8 92.3 89.9
1909 114.3 77.3 88.9 106.3 90.0
1910 112.1 76.8 79.0 106.4 92.0
1911 112.3 77.0 81.3 106.8 100.3
1912 101.3 89.9 108.4 105.7 96.0
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
























Figure 1. Index of Coal, Iron & Steel, and Machinery Imports 






















































































































Figure 2. Index of Machinery Imports 

























































































































Figure 4.   Unweighted Average of Regional Tariffs











1865  1870 1875  1880  1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930  1935
Asia  Core Euro Perip Lat Am Offshoot US
Figure 3. Machinery, Iron and Coal Imports from the USA  and UK 
Relative to GDP 












































































































































































































































































Figure 7 Alternative Views of the Terms of Trade in Latin America 
Figure 7A The Endogenous Export Price Hypothesis 
 







































Intermediate and capital goods imports 
United States: U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Statistics (Treasury 
Department, Bureau of Statistics, before 1904), The Foreign Commerce and Navigation 
of the United States (annual 1870-1914; Washington, DC: USGPO). 
United Kingdom: Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign 
Countries and British Possessions, Parliamentary Papers (London: H.M.S.O, 1870-
1914). 
 
Intermediate and capital goods import deflators 
Wholesale price indexes for historical comparisons, by commodity, editors of the 
Millennial ed., Susan B. Carter ... [et al.] Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. Table Ee 616. Dollar-sterling exchange rates: 1791-1914, Table 
Cc126. Wholesale price indexes for historical comparisons, by commodity group: 1860-
1990 [Hanes], 1890-1914=100, all commodities other than farm products. 
 
Prices and Wages 
Nominal wages for all four countries from Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Real Wages, 
Inequality, and Globalization in Latin America Before 1940,” Revista de Historia   
Economica , vol. 17, special number (1999), pp. 101-42, described in Williamson’s 
website, AppLA_new wages.doc.  
Argentina: Pa from food cost of living index, 1870-1881 from unpublished worksheets of 
Roberto Cortés Conde and 1882-1912 from Roberto Cortés Conde, El progreso 
Argentino 1880-1914 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979), precio alimentos,  
p. 226, caudro 4.10, and 1913 from Williamson (1999), Appendix Table 1.2; Pm from 
Table 7. 
 Brazil: Pa and Pm from Luis Catão, "A New wholesale price index for Brazil during the 
period 1870-1913," Revista Brasileira Economia 1992 46(4): 519-33 (underlying data 
sent by the author). 
 Chile:  w/cpi, cpi and Pm (implicit price deflator for imports) are taken from Juan Braun, 
Matias Braun, Ignacio Briones and Jose Diaz, “Economia Chilena 1810-1995: 
Estadisticas Historicas,” Documento de Trabajo No. 187 (Enero 2000), IEUC-Economia, 
pp. 101, 113 and 134.  Pm deflator is taken to be the implicit price deflator for imports. 
Colombia: Pa based on food cost of living index from Alberto Pardo, Geografía 
Económia y Humana de Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1972); p. 221, 
Cuadro 107; pp. 234-5, Cuadro 110. 
Mexico: Pa and  Pm series calculated by the authors with data from: 1874-1884: El 
Correo del Comercio, La Colonia Española, El Minero Mexicano and La Escuela de 
Agricultura; 1885-1913: La Semana Mercantil. Food prices were weighted with shares 
from Memoria de Haciena 1909-10, pp.725-737 including rice, sugar, cocoa, coffee, 
chili, beans, wheat flour, corn, cheese and salt. Manufactured product prices were the   41
average of yarn no. 20, coarse cloth, cashmeres, bed spread, sugar cane, brandy and soap. 
1879 and 1881-1883 are interpolated. 
Uruguay: Pa and Pm from correspondence with Luis Bértola.  
United States: Nominal wage for the US is annual non-farm earnings of employed 
workers, from United States Historical Statistics (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1975), 
D780 and D735; Pm uses Warren-Pearson textile products 1870-1890 and BLS 
manufactured commodities 1890-1913, US Historical Statistics (1975), E56 and E89. US 
price level: US Historical Statistics (1975): E-183, FRB cost-of-living, p. 212. 
 
Net Barter Terms of Trade 
Argentina: C. Newland, Bulletin of Latin American Research 17 (1998). 
Chile:  Juan Braun, Matias Braun, Ignacio Briones, Jose Diaz, Rolf Luders, and Gert 
Wagner, “Economia Chilena 1810-1995: Estadisticas Historicas,” IEUC Documento de 
Trabajo 187 (Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Eenero 2000), pp. 125-
128.  
Latin America: L. Prados de la Escosura, “The Economic Consequences of Independence 
in Latin America,” 2004 draft, prepared for Cambridge Economic History of Latin 
America Volume I, edited by Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth and Roberto 
Cortés Conde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
Mexico: Pre-1879: R. Dobado González, A. Gómez Galvarriato, and J. G. Williamson, 
“Mexican Exceptionalism,” Journal of Economic History 68 (September 2008). Post-
1878: Blattman-Clemens-Williamson database  
Venezuela: Caracas: Fundación Polar, 1997. Bases Cuantitativas de la Economía 
Venezolana: 1830-1995. Asdrúbal Baptista. C. Newland, Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 17 (1998). 
 
Real Exchange Rate: 
All nominal exchange rates (ER) are expressed as local currency relative to the US$.  
Argentina: ER and price level from Alan Taylor, data underlying his "A Century of 
Purchasing-Power Parity," Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 1 (February 2002), pp. 
139-50. 
Brazil: Price level from Luis Catão, "A New wholesale price index for Brazil during the 
period 1870-1913," Revista Brasileira Economia 1992 46(4), pp. 519-33; ER from Heitor 
Moura Fikho, "Exchange rates of the mil-reis," MPRA Paper 5210, University of Munich 
(November 2007), pp. 16-17. 
Chile: Real ER from Juan Braun, Mathias Braun, Ignacio Briones, and Jose Diaz, 
"Economia Chilena 1810-1995: Estadisticas Historicas," IEUC Documento de Trabajo 
187 ((Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Eenero 2000), p. 123. 
Mexico: Price level is the average of Pm and Pa. ER from INEGI, Estadísticas Históricas 
de México (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 1986), p. 
811.   42
United States: Price level is the FRB cost-of-living index taken from United States 
Historical Statistics (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1975), E-183, p. 212. 
 